Mode of Operation and Performance of Contract Farming of Cottonseed in Haryana by Kumar, Shiv et al.
Agricultural Economics Research Review
Vol. 20   January-June 2007   pp 99-116
1 Scientists, Division of Agricultural Economics, 3 Sr. Scientist, CATAT, Indian
Agricultural Research Institute, New Delhi-110012 and 2 Research Scholar, and
4Reader, Department of Economics, MD University, Rohtak.
The authors thank the referee for his valuable suggestions.
Mode of Operation and Performance of
Contract Farming of Cottonseed in Haryana
Shiv Kumar1, Devender2, Kavita Chakarvarty4, Puran Chand1
and J.P.S. Dabas3
Abstract
The quality of cottonseed matters most for the successful product
development. The quality cottonseed production is monitored by the
Haryana State Seed Certification Agency in the state. The study has
reviewed the prevailing contract cotton farming models; has studied mode
of operation of cotton contractual arrangements; has analyzed the
production matrix, growth and contributions; and has discerned and
quantified variations in intensive structure of public and private seed
firms. It has used both primary and secondary data. Appropriate statistical
tools, viz. exponential growth model, index, etc., have been used to study
the data. All categories of farmers have been brought together under the
management of private seed agency for production of cottonseed of a
single variety on a large homogeneous block. Contract cotton farming has
fully vetted the legal agreements with their growers. The public and private
agencies pay incentive price to farmers which is higher than the prevailing
market price. Farmers of private agency are free from the intricacies of
input and output markets, receive all technology and technical know-how
and have facilities for production and consumption loans, whereas farmers
of public agency are trailed far behind in terms of these benefits. Private
agency has flourished at the expanse of public agency since contract
cotton is incentivised by private contractors under flexible and farmer-
friendly production regime. The latest production technology, strong
capital and management base of private seed agency have left the public
agency behind in the competitive race. The study has concluded that
favourable changes in socio-economic and legal framework of government
policies have to be encouraged for the active participation of private sector
in cottonseed business and contract cottonseed farming has emerged as
a viable alternative farming in the post-WTO regime.100 Agricultural Economics Research Review  Vol.20  January-June 2007
Introduction
Cotton (Gossypium spp.) is the most important source of natural fibre
used in the Indian textile industry. The producers of cotton have started
perceiving marketing rather than production as a constraint in enhancing
their farm income. Hence, it has been suggested that farm production should
be income-focused than price-focussed through contract farming (Kumar
et al., 2005). Contract farming encourages demand-driven production system,
which coordinates many aspects of primary production supply (Fraser, 2005).
Contract farming basically involves four aspects (pre-agreed price, quality,
quantity or acreage, and delivery time) between farmers and company
(Kiresur et al., 2004). The success of contract farming depends on the
mutual benefiting relationship between producer, consumer and company.
The producer benefits from assured price from the company; the company
benefits from assured supply of quality material at competitive price so that
its product becomes successful in national and global markets, as per Codex,
and ultimately, the consumer is benefitted by getting a quality product at a
reasonable price (Kumar and Chand, 2004). This got aligned with the
amendment of Agriculture Produce Market Committee (APMC) Act 2004.
Agribusiness firms have entered into contract cottonseed farming, with farms
specializing in production of quality cotton-seed in the state of Haryana.
However, some inherent differences between public and private seed firms
exist in contract farming in the form of bargaining power, risk-sharing
conditions, etc. (Kumar and Chand, 2004).
Cotton occupied an area of 5.4 lakh hectares with annual production of
10.38 lakh bales in Haryana during 2003-04 (Haryana Agricultural Statistics
at a Glance, 2004). A core group of highly progressive and commercial
farmers is engaged in integrated contract cotton farming (both seed and
lint). Thus, a quality seed production programme is in operation in the Haryana
state, which is being monitored by the Haryana State Seed Certification
Agency (Kumar et al., 2002) to meet the standards of quality seed.
In this backdrop, the present study has been undertaken to (i) review
the prevailing contract cotton farming models, (ii) study the mode of operation
of cotton contractual arrangements in the state, (iii) analyze production matrix,
growth and contributions, and (iv) discern and quantify variations in the
incentive structure of public and private seed firms. The findings of the
study would help the researchers, policymakers, entrepreneurs, extension
people and farmers to encourage contract farming in general and contract
cotton farming, in particular.Kumar et al.: Contract Farming of Cottonseed 101
Methodology
This study was confined to the Haryana state and pertained to the year
2003-04. The study has used primary data for the year 2003-04 and secondary
data for the period 1990-91 to 2003-04. Secondary data on quality cottonseed
production were collected from the annual reports of the Haryana State
Seed Certification Agency (HSSCA). Time series data of cotton firms,
other marketing firms, etc. engaged in contract cotton production were
collected from the state Headquarters. All the firms engaged in contract
farming along with their operational area, business volumes, nature,
characteristic and terms and conditions of contract were collected from the
official records of HSSCA. The lists of farmers of public and private
cottonseed firms were collected from the official records of HSSCA. The
primary data on various aspects, viz. components of technologies, use of
man-power, other socio-economic parameters of contractors and
contractees, etc. of public and private production regimes were collected
through personal interview method, using specially structured and pre-tested
schedule.
Comparing contracts generates the expressions needed to make
conceptual comparisons and gives insights of underlying reasons for various
approaches that one form of contract is chosen from among alternatives in
varying environments under public and private seed firms with various
prevailing contract models. The most significant development after new
economic policy was the evolution of private seed business firms in the
state (Kumar et al., 2002). Hence, it becomes important to know the
direction and speed of change in total contract cottonseed as well as its
market price and incentive price. Tabular analysis such as simple averages
and percentages were carried out to derive the inferences. The growth
rates were computed by fitting an exponential function to the time series
data and results were subjected to ‘t’-test to find the significance level. The
form of growth model was:
Y = a bt …(1)
where,
Y = Price per quintal in rupees,
t = Time period in years, and
‘a’ and ‘b’ are the parameters to be estimated.
It can be expressed in the log form as Equation (2):
log Y= log a + t. log b …(2)
The Compound Growth Rate (CGR) was calculated as per Equation
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CGR (%) = (Antilog [ log b] – 1) × 100 …(3)
The disproportionate variation in the market price and incentive price
(given by public and private firms to farmers) has adverse implications on
the incentive price structure of production of certified cotton by contract
firms. The values of market and incentive prices of public and private seed
firms were standardized to see the direction of change and the index of
premium was computed as per expression (4):
 Actual premium during current year
Index of premium = ——————————————— …(4)
     Premium during base year
Prevailing Models of Contract Cotton Farming in India
In contact farming, an incentive price is offered to the farmer to meet
the extra cost incurred by him in producing the requisite quality of produce.
Contract farming works when there is no zero sum game (no one gains at
the expanse of the other) and helps when market does not exist or is under-
developed; conversely, contracts diminish in importance with the development
of competitive markets. They are ideal under win-win situations, since they
represent a natural mutual dependency. Contractual arrangements in the
country are moving from informal to formal forms (Kumar et al., 2005).
Formal contracts specify the anticipated duties and obligations of different
stakeholders, deliverables and penalties for defaults. There are four types
of contract cotton production models, viz. Pepsi, Tripartite, Tamil Nadu and
Appachi.
(1) Pepsi Model
Price fixation under this model is done directly between farmer and
company. Incentivised cotton by contractor induces the farmer to enter into
contract production, though an individual farmer is not able to bargain with
the company on equal footing (Haque, 2000). Such agreements are relatively
loose, one time informal (oral/handshake) arrangements between the farmer
and the buyer to manage production with input provision and ties loans/
advances. Since the nature and terms and conditions of contract are decided
arbitrarily and can hastily be distorted in favour of the company, there are
frequent breaches of contracts and no arbitration mechanism exists. It is
the most exploitative model in contract farming (Kumar and Chand, 2004).
Private seed firms engaged in cotton farming in the Haryana state practised
a form of this model.Kumar et al.: Contract Farming of Cottonseed 103
(2) Tripartite Model
This model establishes a tripartite arrangement amongst farmer, company
and government and the price fixation is decided by a government agency
in consultations with other two stakeholders. None of the stakeholders, in
letter and spirit, can breach the contract and is liable to penalty in case of
non-compliance of terms and conditions of the contract. Hence, the
compliance of contract is reinforced by a government agency. The most
common variants of this model are:
(a) CCI Contract Model: Cotton Corporation of India (CCI) with the
aid of state government has become a guarantor of operation of contract
cotton farming after the launching of Technology Mission on Cotton in 2001.
CCI has established backward linkages with the farmers, making
arrangements of supplying all sorts of quality inputs, technical know-how,
etc. and has also established forward linkages with cotton mills to cater
corporate consumption. Hence, CCI helps to coordinate quality-led incentive
between textile mills and farmers.
(b) Gujarat Model of Contract Farming: The Agricultural Produce
Marketing Committee (APMC) with the aid of state government has become
a guarantor of operation of contract cotton farming. APMC has established
backward linkages with the farmers involving integrated service providers
and making arrangements of supplying all sorts of quality inputs and technical
know-how to contract farmers. It has also established forward linkages
issuing notification regarding allowing of industrial houses and trading
companies to continue to purchase produce directly from farmers. As a
facilitator in the continuous process of negotiation, the purchases are
sanctioned by the government agency to cotton mills to cater corporate
consumption.
(c) PRIME BIO Model of Contract Farming- PRIME BIO, a part
of the Coimbatore-based automobile engineering major Premier Instruments
and Control Ltd. (PRICOL), has implemented the Dharapuram contract
farming under the banner of Prime Farm Solutions (PFS), its farm service
arm, is the nodal agency to run the contract farming. This contract model
designated under the integrated agriculture development project actually
centres on two crop-choice patterns – high-valued and low-valued agri-
crops and a twin contract model – the five-year land lease to meet term
loan for drip irrigation mechanism and the seasonal or annual crop contract.
These contracts are executed between farmers’ self-help groups in the
designated villages and the PFS, which also entered into back-to-back
contract with industries seeking specific supplies of the commodities. A
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the farmers’ interest and deals with the PFS. The PFS as facilitator arranges
the bank credit for drip irrigation system and crop loan for growers and also
procures support services such as inputs, crop care, insurance cover and
marketing of harvested crop. Major textile houses like Super Spinning Mills,
Precot Mills, etc. have buyback contracts with PFS for the medium/long
staple cotton. This way PRIME BIO caters quality cotton to corporate
consumption. Besides, the PFS is also actively engaged in organizing contract
cultivation of cotton and wheat in Hubli, Dharward and Belhaun regions in
Karnataka.
(3) Tamil Nadu Model of Contract Cotton Farming
In this model, both farmer and company are free to settle the price
mutually. Once the price is settled, it has to be submitted to the enforcement
officer of the state government. Arbitration is resorted to settling disputes
and differences out of court between two or more persons through an
independent and impartial person, if there is breach of contract by either
party. The award is given by law enforcement agency after proper
investigation and hearing. Both parties are liable to comply with the final
award of arbitration (Kumar and Chand, 2004). The common variants of
the model are:
(a) An Act on contract farming exists in Tamil Nadu only. So, the Tirupur-
based Royal Classic Group, which owns the Classic Polo and Smash brands,
entered into a tripartite agreement with the State Government (T.N.) on
contract farming in January 2005. The company had assured the growers
to either pay the minimum guaranteed price or the market price, whichever
was higher. With the consent of the farmers, the government machinery
identified and certified the land. Royal Classic guarantees the purchase at
the minimum guaranteed price and the grower is assured of buyback of the
farm produce around the area of Eroda.
(b) Public sector seed firms in the Haryana state practise this form of
model. The farmers satisfying the criteria of taking contract cottonseed
programme approach the firms of public sector and the firms submit the list
of duly approved contract farmers to the Haryana State Seed Certification
Agency to certify the cotton filed of growers as per codex of quality
standards. The public firms purchase only the certified cotton of growers
with pre-agreed incentive price.
(4) Appachi Model of Intergrated Cotton Farming
The Appachi Care Foundation acts as the coordinating agency between
small farmers and other stakeholders such as input suppliers, service providersKumar et al.: Contract Farming of Cottonseed 105
and actual users of cotton (ginneries, textile mills). Bulk purchases of seeds,
fertilizers and agrochemicals are made at discounted rates and the benefit
is passed on to farmers’ groups. The Foundation has brought small farmers
together and has consolidated them into self-help groups and provides them
with resources, technologies and finance to improve cotton yields.
Agronomists are appointed to render extension advisory service. The Appachi
Care Foundation negotiates with banks for institutional finance for the group
of farmers (who are, otherwise, ineligible for loans) at confessional rate of
interest, as also crop insurance at lower price. A significant feature of the
Appachi Model, is that under his scheme, the farmer has the option but not
the obligation to sell his produce to the coordinating agency. As the price is
not pre-determined, the grower has sufficient marketing flexibility and obtains
the market price. Besides, contract farming can open up new markets,
which would otherwise be unavailable to small farmers. This is ensures
delivery of price benefit to resource-poor farmers in the country. This model
was started in 2002 with about 600 farmers, each holding less than one
hectare of land, covering 400 hectares and formed into 12 self-help groups,
has now been expanded to cover 1500 farmers in 65 self-help groups,
covering over 800 hectares of land spread over four regions of Tamil Nadu
(Business Line, 2004).
Mode of Operation of Contract Farming in the Study Area
Farming contracts succeed if they contain the elements of fair risk
transfer or coverage measures and trust relationships built over long periods.
These work only when there is a market niche for the specialty product
whose demand is more than the supply. A conceptual comparison of
operation of public and private contract farming models has been presented
in Table 1. A perusal of Table 1 revealed that the public agency contracted
with medium and large farmers only, based on the locality of farms, size of
holding, field history, economic condition of the farmer, possession of farm
machinery, assured irrigation, willingness to cultivate at least in 5 acres of
land and level of commitment to the contract for ensuring supply of quality
cotton. On the other hand, the private agency contracted with all categories
of farmers, irrespective of their size of holdings and tried to bring together
small farmers to improve their productive capability and build capacity among
them to face challenge of the market. Bhalla and Roy (1988) had reported
that the economic performance differed considerably even between farms
operating under more or less similar production regimes. Differences in the
economic results are usually attributed to differences in the management of
farms. Small and marginal farmers, badly affected with limited access to




































































Table 1. A comparison of different modes of operations of contract cottonseed farming by public and private agencies in Haryana:
2003-04
Particulars Public sector (Tamil Nadu Model) Private sector (Pepsi Model)
Price settlement (Rs/q) Market price + Bonus @ Rs 180-200/q + Market price + Bonus @ Rs 100-120/q +
Transportation charges Transportation + Certification charges
Categories of farmers Medium and large Small, medium and large
Nature of contract Formal (written) Informal (oral agreement)
Kind of contract Direct Indirect
Linkages Forward Backward and forward
Nature of price Discovered Undiscovered
Mode of payment 2/3rd payment after harvest + 1/3rd after Lumpsum payment (on spot)
‘O.K.’ report
Incentive criterion Based on market price, covers additional cost i) Extent of increase in market price and/or average of
for extra care and maintaining isolation prevailing fortnightly highest market price, ii) Selection
distance of species and choice of variety.
Rouging operation By farmer By labour of private firm
Technology and Only seed All kinds of inputs and technical know-how
  supporting services
Physical take-off limits 85% of produce/unit area No limit
Compensation in crop damage Nil Seed + field certification charge
Market intricacy  Input supply (seed only & buyback output Free from both input and output markets
Arbitration mechanism Yes No
Credit facility No Yes
Production decision Independent Dictates of firm prevail
Source: Based on primary survey data (2003-04)Kumar et al.: Contract Farming of Cottonseed 107
price collapse in market. Inconsistent quality is another issue. Cotton growers
have to face the vagaries of not only weather but market place also. Flinn
(1993) has explained that heterogeneity in cotton quality arises only across
compact land areas of production due to differing soils, water, agro-climates
and location; and to minimize the impact of diverse environment, a uniform
variety of cotton is grown under the contract farming system, ensuring
uniformity in the quality of produce. Hence, the private firms contract with
the small farmers for undertaking cotton production of a single variety by
encompassing neighbouring land areas to make a large homogeneous block.
This revolves around the principle of ‘one variety, one quality and one
village’. Contractual arrangements vary across production regimes (Haque,
1999). The nature of contract may differ according to variations in the
nature of crops and the context in which they are practised. Farmers choose
one suitable production regime, ranging from informal to formal contracts
(Kumar and Chand, 2004). The nature of contract production of the public
sector’s firm is in writing and has fully vetted legal agreements with their
growers. A farmer has to submit all terms and conditions of contract on an
affidavit to the HSSCA. The nature of contract of private firm is indirectly
written between farmer and the HSSCA, but is oral between farmer and
private firm. The farmer produces cotton for a private firm but firm acts as
a middleman between the farmer and the HSSCA.
The primary producers will, in future, rely less on conventional price
discovery mechanism and more on exclusive supply arrangements (AFFA,
2002). The method of price settlement of public agency is on flat rate basis
but of private agency is on varying rates basis. The public agency paid Rs
180-200 more on the prevailing market price to contract growers. The private
firms were paying an incentive price ranging betweenRs.100 to Rs.120 per
quintal on the prevailing market price to farmers for cotton production,
depending upon spices of cotton (upland and lowland cotton) and the choice
of variety under the Pepsi model. The criteria of incentive price were: (i)
the extent of increase in procurement price and/or the average of prevailing
highest fortnightly market price, and (ii) type of cotton spices and choice of
the variety. The aim was to keep the incentive price over and above the
prevailing market/procurement price. The transportation costs of the produce
are paid to the farmer by the agencies of both public and private sectors as
per distance covered. The public procurement agency has put a maximum
physical take off limit of cotton per acre because of undersized, damaged
cotton seed etc., whereas farmers hooked to private agency have no such
limit on per acre basis. Contract is used to motivate behaviour and
performance of grower and can often minimize transaction cost associated
with business (Fraser, 2002). Moreover, all expenses and responsibilities of108 Agricultural Economics Research Review  Vol.20  January-June 2007
cotton certification on behalf of farmers are borne by the private agency,
while farmers of public agency have to bear such expenses themselves.
According to Goodhue (1999), moral hazard and profit maximization
arguments can be used to justify as to why certain contracts might explicitly
control the choice of various inputs used by a grower. A farmer of private
firm receives all production technology and extension services, whereas a
farmer of public agency is provided only the seeds and the rest of inputs
used in cotton production are to be managed by himself. The private agency
deducts all input costs at the time of procurement of cotton and the remaining
payments are made to the farmers after the receipt of all lots of cotton at
ginning plant, as per contract. The mode of payment of public agency to the
farmer is on installment basis. Two-thirds of the total payments are made to
the farmer after receipt of cotton at the ginnery and the remaining one-third
payment is released after getting the ‘O.K’ seed test report from the state
seed-testing laboratory. Growers enter into contractual arrangements for
reasons such as risk reduction, lack of capital, more income, etc. (Kliebenstein
and Lawrence, 1995). No compensation is paid to the farmers of the public
agency in case of damage of crop, whereas the farmers of private agency
get exemption from seed and certification costs and the remaining cost
incurred in the production of cotton crop is recovered from the next crop
season. The farmer of public agency is free only from output (seed and lint)
market but not free from complexities of input market, whereas the farmer
of private agency is free from the complexities of both input and output
markets. Hence, contract cotton farming linkage in public agency has only
forward linkage, whereas the farmers of private agency have both forward
and backward linkages.
In general, the producer gives up the opportunity for higher prices in
return for protection from low prices. The farmers of public agency have
the option of readdressal of their grievances by arbitration mechanism in
case of breach of contract, but the farmers of private agency have no such
option of readdressal or suing of a case in the court of law since the contract
between farmer and private agency is oral and indirect. The farmer of
private agency has facility for production as well consumption loans. Thus,
contract farming has potential to be an effective instrument for credit
deepening with more involvement of private sector in agriculture. Haque
(1999) has emphasized that contract farming may encourage ‘Proletariat
class of peasant farmers’. The family of contract farmer of private firm
loses its independent decision-making power on crop production under the
dictates of firm. Moreover, informal contracts are always not well understood,
with prices, quality stipulations and respective responsibilities being the major
areas of confusion.Kumar et al.: Contract Farming of Cottonseed 109
Production Matrix for Cotton under Contract
The basic concept of production matrix is to formally identify all the key
components that influence seed production in terms of their significance,
responsibility and performance. Essential components have to be achieved
in their entirety; otherwise the seed programme would be placed in
considerable jeopardy. Necessary components generally have to be achieved
to the maximum extent possible, although marginal performance of one or
two such components would not necessarily endanger the programme.
Desirable components are considered necessary but not vital for the seed
programmer’s success. Contract farming, which normally incorporates new
management methods and capital, needs incessant feedback regarding the
acceptance/rejection or modification of new techniques suiting to farm
situation by farmers, the changing working patterns and seed production
capabilities of farmers. Components under achievement and significance
ranking have been tabulated in Table 2.
In the above matrix, it could be seen that all essential components have
been achieved, except for research and training, which is inadequate. The
sponsors should collate with the cotton institutes and universities for imparting
skills to seed growers and for advanced research and in disseminating the
technologies for a technically feasible and economically viable and eco-
friendly seed programme under contract farming. All the desirable
Table 2. Production and post-harvest matrix for cotton under contract
Component                           Public                        Private
Achievement Significance Achievement Significance
Ranking Ranking Ranking Ranking
Farmer’s selection 3 E 3 E
Land area allocation 3 D 2 D
Seed supply 2 E 3 E
Research and training 1 E 1 E
Plant protection 2 N 3 N
Credit deepening 1 N 3 N
Farm machinery 2 D 3 D
Certification procedure 3 E 3 E
Harvesting 2 N 2 N
Timely delivery of outputs 3 E 3 E
Assured buyback 3 E 3 E
Timely payment 2 N 3 N
Key: 1 = Inadequate; 2 = Adequate and 3 = Objectives achieved; E= Essential, N=
Necessary and D = Desirable.
Source: Primary survey data, 2003-04.110 Agricultural Economics Research Review  Vol.20  January-June 2007
components have been achieved, except credit depending to the farmers of
public seed firms, which is inadequate. The sponsors should collate with
public and private financial institutions for advancing credits and its assured
recovery from the contract farmers at the time of procurement of desirable
quality produce. From Table 3, it could be seen that the contract farmers
availed the advantage of increase in yield to the tune of 500-600 kg against
300-400 kg in the case of non-contract farmers due to adoption of
recommended package and practices to the farmers’ fields.
It has been found that cost minimization up to Rs 360 per acre could be
obtained under contract cotton-seed production of private firms because
the costs of certification procedure and transportation were borne by seed
firms. Incentive prices offered to contract farmers of public and private
seed firms were more by 10-15 per cent and 5-10 per cent, respectively, on
open market price. This discerned that contract farming is increasing farmer’s
income by reducing the cost of cultivation. Most important of all, 2/3rd payment
is made on procurement of produce to contract farmers of public seed firms
and remaining 1/3rd payment is made after the seed test report (nearly six
months). On the other side, on the spot, full payment is made to the contract
farmers of private seed firms, whereas in the case of non-contract farming,
it takes 30 to 40 days to get the entire payment. Contract farmers of public
and private seed firms can get loans at the annual rate of 9-10 per cent as
against 12-14 per cent in the case of non-contract farmers.
Table 4 shows that the sponsor gets the kapas of uniform quality of
single cotton variety as per requirement of pressing and spinning technology
of mills with low trash content, less contamination, and increased realization
by weight under contract farming. But, cotton under contract is ginned by
ginneries of seed firms and textile mills at the rate of Rs 75-100 per bale
purchased lint available with seed firms more than that of market price.
Table 3. Benefits and facilities enjoyed by the contract farmers
Particulars Non-contract Public contract Private contract
farmer farmer farmer
Yield, kg/acre 300-400 500-560 500-600
Input cost Nil Additional cost Cost reduction
Rs 360/acre Rs 360/acre
Incentive price Nil 10 to 15 % more 5 to 10 % more
on MP on MP
Payment 30-40 days 2/3rd on spot + On spot full
1/3rd after 6 months payment
Crop loan interest 12-14% annum 9 % per annum 10 % per annum
Source: Primary survey data, 2003-04Kumar et al.: Contract Farming of Cottonseed 111
These textile mills are assured of uniform quality of cotton lint of a single
variety from seed processing firms because seed firms maintain genetic as
well physical purities of seed of a single variety under the supervision and
control of a seed certification officer. Most important of all is that seed
firms could get quality seed as per stringent seed certification standards.
Performance of Public and Private Sectors
Generally, the cotton produced in Haryana is not of very good quality
and is mostly consumed in the state (Duhan, 1998). Performance of public
and private seed agencies in contract cotton production in the state is given
in Tables 5 and 6. A perusal of Tables 5 and 6 revealed that contribution of
the public agency in contract cotton production was 40 per cent in 1990-91
in the state, which had decreased to 28 per cent in 1993-94. After the
establishment of WTO, its share went down drastically and reached nearly
8 per cent in the year 2002-03. The detrended growth rate of public agency
computed as 1.77 per cent per annum was statistically significant.
The contribution of private agency was 56 per cent in 1990-91, which
increased to nearly 92 per cent in 2002-03. The detrended growth rate of
the private agency was computed as 2.39 per cent per annum, which was
Table 4. Benefits enjoyed by the seed firms/cotton mills
Particulars Market                         Contract cotton
cotton Public Private
Uniform quality Mix 98.5% genetic and 98.5% genetic and
of cotton seed physical purities of physical purities of
single variety single variety




Trash content 3-4.5% 1-2 % 1-2%
Contamination 12-22 mg 0-1.5 gram < 1 gram
per bale per bale per bale




Margin on sale Nil Rs 75 per bale Rs 75-100 per bale
of lint available
with seed firms
Source: Primary survey data, 2003-04112 Agricultural Economics Research Review  Vol.20  January-June 2007
Table 5. Growth rates of cottonseed production of public and private firms in
Haryana: 1990-91 to 2002-03




Source: Official Records of HSSCA, Panchkula, Haryana
* Significant at 5% level, NS- Non-significant
Table 6. Contributions of public and private sectors in contract cotton production
in the state of Haryana: 1990-91 to 2002-03
(in per cent)
Year Public Private Total
1990-91 43.99 56.01 100
1991-92 49.18 50.82 100
1992-93 39.06 61.74 100
1993-94 27.70 72.29 100
1994-95 12.73 87.26 100
1995-96 9.95 90.03 100
1996-97 9.72 90.26 100
1997-98 3.09 96.90 100
1998-99 1.87 98.12 100
1999-2K 6.89 92.76 100
2000-01 11.46 88.53 100
2001-02 9.46 90.53 100
2002-03 8.33 91.66 100
Source: Official Records of HSSCA, Panchkula, Haryana
statistically significant. But, the detrended growth rate of the overall contract
cotton in the state was – 0.02 per cent per annum, which was statistically
non-significant. It could be concluded that the growth rate of cotton production
was almost stagnant due to monopsonistic nature of market. Between a
given period, the share of public agency had diminished and that of private
agency had increased. It could be concluded that the private agency flourished
at the cost of public agency and captured a major portion of contract cotton
production of public sector in the state. It might be due to the facts that
contract of private agency was quasi-formal, farmer-friendly and flexible to
the need and requirement of farmers as compared to the contract of public
agency. The private business firms have sharpened their competitive edge
and the public agency is lagging behind in the competitive race, losing their
share in contract cotton production; their technological obsolescence is also
worrying them. In addition, favourable changes in socio-economic and legalKumar et al.: Contract Farming of Cottonseed 113
framework of government policies have encouraged active participation of
private agency in agribusiness.
Standardized Values of Public and Private Seed Agencies
Standardized values of public seed agency, market price and private
seed companies are given in Tables 7 and 8. A perusal of these tables
revealed that prevailing market price of cotton increased almost more than
two-times per quintal during the period 1990-91 to 2002-03. The standardized
values of market price and incentive price of public and private agencies
depicted (Fig. 1) that the standardized values of incentive price of public
and private sectors always remained above than the standardized value of
market price. It purported that contract cotton was incentivised by contractors
and the incentive price remained favourable to farmers thoughout the study
period, even though the market prices slipped down below the procurement
price in 2003-04. The last column of Table 4 of private agency depicts that
the percentage premium on market price continued to exhibit a mixed trend
in the given period, but during the initial years it slipped down from 8.4 per
cent in 1990-91 to 5.6 per cent in 1994-95. It started showing increasing
premium percentage and reached 10 per cent in 2003-04. The last column
of Table 5 of public agency showed diminishing incentive price over the
market price and reached almost equal to the percentage incentive over
market price of private agency.
Fig. 1. A comparison of standardized value of market price, incentive price of
private agency and incentive price of public agency firms114 Agricultural Economics Research Review  Vol.20  January-June 2007
Table 7. Standardized value of minimum support price, market price, incentive
price and percentage premium on market price of cottonseed production
of private agency in Haryana: 1990-91 to 2003-04
Year MP IP MP IP (MP×100) (Ip×100) Incentive
Base=895 over MP
(%)
1990-91 895 1045 1.00 1.17 100 117 8.40
1991-92 975 1125 1.09 1.26 109 126 8.20
1992-93 1297 1447 1.45 1.62 145 162 6.80
1993-94 2008 2158 2.24 2.41 224 241 5.00
1994-95 1950 2100 2.18 2.35 218 235 5.60
1995-96 1553 1703 1.73 1.90 173 190 7.40
1996-97 2050 2200 2.29 2.46 229 246 5.90
1997-98 2150 2300 2.40 2.57 240 257 5.80
1998-99 1733 1883 1.94 2.10 194 210 7.80
1999-2K 2020 2170 2.26 2.42 226 242 7.40
2000-01 1833 1983 2.05 2.22 205 222 8.40
2001-02 2006 2156 2.24 2.41 224 241 8.20
2002-03 2341 2491 2.61 2.78 261 278 7.50
2003-04 1740 1890 1.94 2.11 194 211 10.00
Source: Official Record of Market Committee, Haryana
Table 8. Standardized value of minimum support price, market price, incentive
price and percentage premium on market price of cottonseed production
of public agency in Haryana: 1990-91 to 2003-04
Year MSP MP IP MP IP (MP×100) (Ip×100) Incentive
Base=895 over MP
(%)
1990-91 620 895 1045 1.00 1.23 100 123 22.34
1991-92 645 975 1125 1.09 1.33 109 133 20.51
1992-93 800 1297 1447 1.45 1.71 145 171 15.42
1993-94 900 2008 2158 2.24 2.55 224 255 9.96
1994-95 1000 1950 2100 2.18 2.49 218 249 10.26
1995-96 1150 1553 1703 1.73 2.01 173 201 12.88
1996-97 1180 2050 2200 2.29 2.60 229 260 9.76
1997-98 1330 2150 2300 2.40 2.72 240 272 11.63
1998-99 1440 1733 1883 1.94 2.23 194 223 14.43
1999-2K 1575 2020 2170 2.26 2.57 226 257 12.38
2000-01 1625 1833 1983 2.05 2.35 205 235 13.64
2001-02 1675 2006 2156 2.24 2.55 224 255 12.46
2002-03 1725 2341 2491 2.61 2.95 261 295 10.68
2003-04 1775 1740 1890 1.94 2.23 194 223 14.37
Source: Official Record of Market Committee, Haryana.Kumar et al.: Contract Farming of Cottonseed 115
Summary and Conclusions
Cotton production needs to be income-focused than price-focused
through contract farming with the amendment of the Agriculture Produce
Market Committee Act (2005) that has enabled direct marketing between
the farmer, cooperative, private companies etc. and has opened up contract
farming to create avenues for the private sector. Four types of contract
cotton farming models, viz. Pepsi, Tripartite, Tamil Nadu and Appachi, are
prevalent in the country. Public agency undergoes contact with only medium
and large farmers, whereas private agency contracts with all categories of
farmers to bring together small farmers for undertaking the programme of
cotton production of a single variety on a large homogeneous block. Contract
cottonseed farming has fully vetted legal agreements with their growers.
The public and private agencies pay a better incentive price to contract
growers than the prevailing market price. Private agency bears all expenses
and responsibilities of cotton certification on behalf of farmers and farmers
receive all production technology and extension services while public agency
bears no such expenses and responsibilities and farmers receive only quality
seed on payment basis. The farmers of public agency have the option of
readdressal of their grievances but no such option exists with farmers of
private agency. To keep strong linkanges with farmers, the private agency
provides not only production and consumption loans to its farmers but has
also captured a major portion of public agency in the state. The premium
percentage of private agency on market price hoveres between 5 and 10
per cent and that of public agency has diminished after WTO, reaching
almost equal to the percentage incentive over the market price of private
agency. The study has concluded that the private agency has sharpened its
competitive edge while the public agency has lagged behind in competitive
race perhaps due to obsolescence of technology, weak management, capital
constraints, etc. Moreover, the favourable changes in socio-economic and
legal framework of government policies have encouraged active participation
of the private sector in cottonseed business. The commitment-driven contact
farming has emerged as a viable alternative-farming model, which provides
assured and reliable input service to farmers and desired farm-produce to
the contracting firms.
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